Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan

破产领域中董事义务与债权人保护

                —— 美国、德国、日本之比较

Justin Wood 贾斯丁·伍德

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I. Introduction引言
 
The ability of creditors to enforce fiduciary duties against directors when a corporation enters the zone of insolvency has emerged in the last decade as a major question in corporate governance scholarship and practice. Since United States ("U.S.") case law remains largely undeveloped in this area, an analysis of the approach to the agency cost problem in the zone of insolvency in other major jurisdictions could provide helpful guidance in shaping U.S. law. This article compares and analyzes director duties and creditor protections when corporations enter the zone of insolvency in the U.S., Germany, and Japan.

过去十年，债权人在公司进入破产程序时对公司的董事追究信义义务已成为公司治理学术与实践一个主要的问题。鉴于美国判例法在此问题上进展不大，因而分析前提主要国家在破产领域中的代理成本问题的研究路径可能为形成美国法律提供有益的指导。本文分析并比较了美国、德国、日本在公司破产时董事的义务和债权人保护。

Conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders intensify once a corporation enters the zone of insolvency. With the depletion of corporate assets, creditors begin to displace shareholders as residual claimants on a firm's assets. However, since shareholders maintain control rights prior to the institution of insolvency proceedings, the agency cost problem of shareholder opportunism vis-a-vis creditors intensifies during the zone of insolvency.

公司进入破产程序后，债权人与股东利益冲突激烈，随着公司资产的耗损，债权人开始取代股东要求对公司剩余资产享有权利。然而，由于股东在启动破产程序之前仍保留其对公司的控制权，破产中股东机会主义的代理成本问题与债权人的对立激化了。

Although the need for law to provide creditors additional protection is debatable, each comparative jurisdiction responds to this agency cost problem by providing mechanisms of creditor protection. The U.S. and Germany provide creditor protection through a combination of standards, strategies, and increased creditor enforcement mechanisms. In contrast, Japan provides creditor protection through corporate governance practice that puts creditors at the helm of struggling firms. Relative to Germany and Japan's response, the U.S.'s response best addresses this agency cost problem by minimizing the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors and allowing directors to maximize firm value.

尽管法律是否有必要为债权人提供额外保护仍有争议，但每个比较区域都是通过债权人保护机制来应对代理费用问题。美国和德通过诸标准、策略以及强化债权人实施机制的结合给债权人提供保护。与之相对的，日本的债权人保护则是通过公司治理的实践，让债权人控制困境中的公司。与德国和日本相比，美国的回答最佳，通过最小化股东和债权人的利益冲突并允许董事最大化公司的价值来解决代理成本问题。

Part II of this article discusses the agency cost problems prevalent in the zone of insolvency. Parts III, IV, and V outline the responses to this agency cost problem in the U.S., Germany, and Japan respectively. Part VI analyzes the extent to which each country's response addresses these agency cost problems. Finally, part VII concludes that the U.S. approach best addresses these agency cost problems by giving managers the flexibility to maximize firm value in the face of competing stakeholder interests.

本文的第二部分讨论了破产领域的现行代理成本问题。第三、四、五部分分别概述了美国、德国、日本应对代理成本问题的不同做法。第五部分分析了每一国家在多大程度上解决代理问题。最后，第六部分得出的结论，美国解决代理成本问题的方法最优，它在面对股东的竞争性利益时赋予经营者最大化公司价值的灵活性。

II. Agency Cost Problems in the Zone of Insolvency破产中的代理成本问题
 
A corporation's entrance into the zone of insolvency magnifies the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors. As insolvency looms, competition for limited (and likely diminishing) corporate resources intensifies between shareholders and creditors each seeking a return on invested capital. As a result, the specter of shareholder opportunism vis-a-vis creditors becomes an increasingly significant agency cost for firms approaching insolvency. Moreover, this agency cost is amplified because shareholders and creditors influence board decision-making through different mechanisms,[1] have access to different degrees of information about the company, and face collective action problems.

公司进入破产程序放大了股东与债权人的利益冲突。随着破产程序的深入，股东与债权人对有限的（并且很可能消失的）公司资源的争夺加剧了，每一方都寻求返回投资资本。结果是，对濒临破产的公司而言，对股东机会主义与债权人对抗的忧虑演变为不断增长的代理费用。不仅如此，代理成本成倍增加，因为股东和债权人通过各自不同的机制对董事会的决议施加影响，拥有的公司信息渠道等级不同，并面临集体诉讼问题。

Four specific conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors in the zone of insolvency magnify agency costs. [2] First, shareholders and creditors have different risk preferences for management's investment of corporate resources. Second, each party may attempt to siphon out the firm's assets. Third, shareholders and creditors may have divergent preferences regarding whether the company should liquidate or continue operating as a going concern. Finally, shareholders may have an incentive to under-invest corporate resources when only creditors will benefit from the return on investment. The remainder of this section discusses these conflicts of interest in greater detail.

股东与债权人在破产过程中四个具体的利益冲突增加了代理成本。第一，股东与债权人对管理层对公司资源的投资具有不同的风险意识偏好。第二，每一方均试图抽走公司资产。第三，股东与债权人对公司应清算还是继续经营存在相反的偏好，这持续令人注目。最后，若投资回报仅对债权人有利，股东可能有意减少公司资源的投入。本节余下部分将具体讨论这些利益冲突。

注解：

jurisdictions，该词一般指司法管辖，西方作者在写法学论文时经常用指代“国家”。

collective action：指集体诉讼。Action 一词在法律术语中一般意思为诉讼。

instituting debt collection or insolvency proceedings。启动收债程序或破产程序。本文中institute 系动词，指某一司法程序的启动。收债程序类似我国民事诉讼的崔告程序。

under-invest corporate resources，减少公司资源的投入。under-invest 这个词是作者发明的，故只能从上下文中推测其含义。

a return on invested capital，指对投资资本的回收。Return 一词有回收和回报之意。在本文中，翻译为回收似更为贴切。

have access to different degrees of information about the company, 拥有的公司信息渠道等级不同。股东相对于公司属于内幕人，而债权人相对于公司属于外部人，因此作者如此说。

Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency：忠实义务在公司破产中的转向。